Certain campaigns have been specifically chosen for analysis as they show the progressive nature of the bomber offensive. Precision bombing and early examples of area bombing through to the climax, the Battle of Berlin, will therefore be examined. The traditionalist historiographical perspective, personified by Harris will be considered against those of revisionist historians like Verrier and Hastings, who both have a sympathetic yet critical view of the bombing offensive.

The earliest offensives of Bomber Command were wholly ineffective with Harris quoting the figure of only one in ten bombers getting within five miles of any Ruhr target (11). The switch to 'area' bombing, which was effective before the arrival of Harris, saw an improvement in the success rate of Bomber Command. On 28-29 March 1942, Lubeck went up in flames. It was not a vital target but conclusively proved that even the small force Harris employed - 234 aircraft on this occasion - could destroy the greater part of a town of secondary importance (12).

The raid was hailed a success (13). It is estimated that 45 to 50 per cent of the city was destroyed and that most of the devastation had been caused by fire (14). This was apparent throughout the main bomber offensive, with massive firestorms destroying Hamburg and Dresden. It was estimated that some two hundred acres of Lubeck had been devastated by firestorms (15). A similar fate befell Rostock as the offensive began to gather momentum. This attack saw a combination of area and precision bombing and succeeded in destroying 580 acres of Rostock at the expense of twelve aircraft (16). This preliminary phase also saw damage to Oberhausen, Mainz, Karlsruhe and Saarbrucken. Despite this, Harris admitted that continuing to destroy targets of moderate importance in the long run would be as much an admission of defeat as German attacks on towns like Norwich and Bath hailed for their historical importance only.

For this reason, the next step was to target a major industrial area. Harris contested that a successful large-scale raid would 'give Bomber Command a definite objective to work towards' (17). This objective was the systematic destruction of the German war machine by strategic bombing.

The first single 'thousand-bomber' offensive was the biggest investment of men and resources by Bomber Command to date. Nevertheless, it posed grave risks. Preparations were made during May 1942 for the dispatch of a thousand bombers under the guise of 'Operation Millennium' (18). The attack took place on the night of 30 May 1942 and Cologne was selected as the target. A force of 1,047 (19) aircraft was dispatched (20). Of this, 898 of the returning crews claimed they attacked the target. They had dropped 1,455 tons of bombs (21). The casualty rate was 3.3 per cent, with 39 aircraft missing, which was considerably less than the average 4.6 per cent for offensives undertaken in the last twelve months (22).

It must therefore be contended that the devastation of Cologne as a large industrial city, proved to be worth the investment of Bomber Command's scarce resources. Bomber Command's comparative loss rate in terms of manpower and aircraft at Cologne was effectively less. However, disagreement remains over whether Cologne's defences were effectively saturated. Harris contests that these figures prove conclusively that the defences were saturated. Webster and Frankland disagree (23). What can be ascertained, however, is that 600 acres of Cologne was destroyed. This proved to be nearly as much damage as all Bomber Command' previous attacks, which saw 780 acres destroyed (24).

The main pressure put on Harris after his assumption of command was to attack the Ruhr, the industrial heartland of Germany. After the success of Cologne, this was now considered feasible (25). However, the Ruhr was a more sprawling target with many significant towns and cities within the region, and would take far more than one raid to devastate. Bomber Command had to commit more resources and manpower to the offensive and there is still great debate over its success. Of the 43 major attacks, some 18,506 sorties were dispatched, 872 failed to return and 2,126 were damaged (26). 4.7 per cent was a high loss of aircraft and aircrew for any battle but the Ruhr was a particularly well defended and difficult target to hit. On some nights, 30 per cent of aircraft dispatched had come back damaged or failed to return (27). Hastings posed the question of; 'Who was winning this extraordinary contest between bombs and concrete?' and in return answered that; 'the struggle seemed as far as ever from any decisive conclusion' (28). This view clashed with Harris who termed the Ruhr campaign as 'a whole succession of catastrophes, which overcame the cities of the Ruhr' (29). Based on the evidence, it is fair to say that the Ruhr was dealt a series of crippling blows. Nevertheless, the Ruhr area specifically, and Germany in general, was a far from capitulation. The losses sustained in the Ruhr left Bomber Command a narrow margin with which to preserve the future fighting efficiency of the force. However, the Ruhr was one of the 'must be destroyed' targets and Bomber Command's high loss rate was considered acceptable against such a well-defended target. Compared to the losses suffered by the army taking part in the drive into the already devastated Ruhr by early 1944, Bomber Command's losses were extremely low. It was calculated that 400 acres of Germany had been destroyed in 1942. By 1943, this increased to 26,000 acres. Harris' daily availability of bombers rose from 593 in February 1943 to 787 in August 1943 (30). This illustrates the rapid progression in the provision of men and resources into Bomber Command.

After the losses sustained in the Battle of the Ruhr, Bomber Command found it necessary to use a new technological advance called 'Window'. This had previously been available to the Command but there was considerable reluctance to implement it, as they feared the Germans might adopt it and use it against them. The opening attack on Hamburg by 700 H2S guided aircraft occurred on the night of 24-25 July 1943. The attack caused gigantic fires, which were still alight after twenty-four hours (31). On the 27-28 July, the Command attacked again and caused a scene 'beyond all human imagination'; the firestorm (32). The attack of 29-30 July constituted the heaviest of all attacks in terms of weight of bombs dropped (33). A German account stated that, 'the whole of Hamburg was on fire' and that 'economically, Hamburg was knocked out, as even the undamaged parts had to stop work on account of the destruction of water, gas and electricity supplies'.

Harris believed this raid was possibly the most successful to date, although the last offensive of 2-3 August failed to achieve any real concentration due to unexpectedly poor weather (34). The average loss rate for all previous attacks on Hamburg had been 6 per cent but had now fallen to 2.4 per cent. Harris believed Germany was faced with a double catastrophe with the second largest city in Germany wiped out in nearly three nights and the German defences being thrown into confusion by the advent of 'Window' (35). His aircraft had flown 3,095 sorties and poured 9,000 tons of explosives and incendiaries on to Hamburg for the loss of 86 aircraft (36). Another 174 or 5.6 per cent of those dispatched had been damaged (37). The destruction amounted to 6,200 acres of the most densely built-up district (38). 42,000 Germans were estimated to have died (39). Verrier contests that only a 'moderate success' was gained. He argues that only if high explosives had predominated in the second raid and Hamburg had been blown up and set on fire, would fresh shock have been caused among the German leaders. He indicates that Hamburg had survived and that no other city was attacked with sufficient weight to allow for the onset of an area offensive covering all of western Germany (40). Nevertheless, Hamburg was a great success for Bomber Command and saw, if only for a short period, confusion and panic setting in among the German leaders. It is agreed that the devastation inflicted on Hamburg was no greater than what many Ruhr towns had experienced but, combined with the sharp drop in the average loss of men and resources, illustrates the worth of the assault on Hamburg.

At this point, the 'Pointblank Directive' saw Bomber Command follow 'a road to Berlin', where they bomber offensive climaxed. Harris believed 'we can wreck Berlin from end to end' at an estimated loss of four to five hundred aircraft. He was convinced it would cost Germany the war (41).

The Battle of Berlin was not merely an assault on a single city but a convenient title for a sustained struggle embracing targets all over Germany. Hastings contends the city was 'too large to lend itself to a second Hamburg; too deep in Germany to achieve similar concentrated attack against heavy opposition; and too difficult to hit accurately by means of H2S'. The operation was simply beyond Bomber Command's capabilities (42). In all, Bomber Command made sixteen major attacks on the German capital, fought in appalling weather and in conditions resembling none other in the history of warfare (43).

According to Harris, judging by the standards of the attack on Hamburg, Berlin was not an overwhelming success. With far more sorties, a far greater bomb load, and ten times as many casualties, Bomber Command appeared to have destroyed only a third of the area devastated during the attack on Hamburg (44). Nevertheless, Hastings argues Bomber Command exaggerated this damage to boost public morale (45). Arguably, Harris' policy was too ambitious and the offensive almost caused the destruction of Bomber Command (46). Revisionist historians argue it was largely a failure. Bomber Command's losses were more than double Harris' initial estimates.

One important target at this time was Nuremberg. This offensive is now widely regarded amongst historians as an isolated disaster. It marked the culmination in the night offensive of unsustainable casualty rates (47).

On the night of 30 March 1944, 795 aircraft were dispatched to Nuremberg. 94 (48) failed to return, netting a loss rate of 11.8 per cent. A further 71 were damaged (49). Revisionist historiography on Nuremberg, particularly Webster and Frankland, question the unconventional tactics employed by Bomber Command, as they shed previous practices of intentional ruses and deception and opted for a more open offensive.

This gave the Luftwaffe a unique opportunity (50). This unfortunate mistake coincided with a new form of defensive attrition by the Germans where the bomber stream attacked along the whole journey rather than just over the target itself (51). The Luftwaffe accounted for a high proportion of the bombers that had failed to return (52).

The Nuremberg operation is one of Harris' most bitter memories 'not for itself, but for what posterity has made of it' (53). It signaled the end of his personal attempt to defeat Germany by raising her cities, but he confessed his surprise at not suffering a number of similar disasters (54).

The force suffered misfortune and uncharacteristically poor planning. Nevertheless, it is fair to conclude that the Nuremberg operation was not worth the cost in men and resources Bomber Command had invested. The loss rate was higher than most other raids and only a small number of aircraft reached the target at all.

After the failure at Berlin, the Pointblank Offensive came to an end and preparations for Overlord began with the Command assisting allied armies in their drives into Germany. The attack on Dresden was one such raid.

In February 1945, Harris was instructed to attack Dresden. It was believed a heavy air attack would render Dresden useless as a controlling centre of defence. The 800 aircraft strong attack took place on the night of 13-14 February 1945. Harris claims the attack was almost as overwhelming as that on Hamburg, although the area destroyed was far less (55), with a firestorm similar to that which engulfed Hamburg (56). The destruction of Dresden was considered a military necessity (57). Indeed, Hastings argues that a multitude of political influences, particularly Churchill, were behind the bombing of Dresden to show western support to Russia before the Yalta Conference (58). Overtly, Dresden had been such a desirable target in Operation Thunderclap in 1944, that Britain tried to get the Soviet Air Forces to attack it (59). Verrier contests Dresden was a political target that made no contribution to the German war effort (60). He continues by saying no one involved in the offensive could justify the attack and Dresden was the danger of carrying on an idea to its logical conclusion (61).

The truth of bombing Dresden probably lies in between these extremes and is summed up by Baxter:

"The Russians were advancing and by destroying Dresden, the Germans were stopped from moving reinforcements from the west to counter the Russian advance. This kept the German forces ill-equipped and easier to capture.

Dresden possibly was not as important as people had been led to believe, but there is always the possibility that a lot of the supporting evidence had been destroyed in the firestorm." (62)

Information on losses is hard to locate but at least eight Lancasters were downed. Although 1,600 acres of Dresden was devastated and 30,000 to 100,000 people were killed at very low losses, Dresden has to be considered somewhere between a success and failure as it is not clear if any military objective worth its costs was achieved (63).

Dresden was the last major raid of the war with the final bombs falling on Kiel on the 2-3 May 1945. By the end of the war, Germany's cities lay in ruins. That in itself justifies the bombing campaign's worth in men and resources.

11 - A. Harris p. 90 12 - Ibid., p. 105 13 - Bob Baxter, Bomber Command Historian 14 - Webster & Frankland, Stategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-45, Volume 1 15 - Ibid., p. 393 16 - A. Harris p. 105 17 - M. Hastings, p. 150 18 - A. Harris, p. 111 19 - Harris states that the number of aircraft dispatched was 1,047 but Max Hastings claims only 1,046 were dispatched. The reason for this inconsistency is unclear ....20 - A. Harris, p. 107 21 - Webster & Frankland, p. 407 22 - A. Harris, p. 112 23 - Webster & Frankland, p. 408 24 - A. Harris, p. 112 25 - The Battle of the Ruhr began on 5 March 1943 with a Bomber Command raid on Essen and finished on the 13 July 1943 with an offensive against Aachen 26 - Webster & Frankland, pp. 108-9 27 - Ibid., p. 110 28 - M. Hastings, p. 204 29 - A. Harris, p. 48 30 - M. Hastings, p. 204 31 - A. Harris, p. 173 32 - Ibid. 33 - Ibid., p. 174 34 - Ibid., p. 175 35 - Ibid. 36 - M. Hastings, p. 201 37 - Webster & Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-45, Volume II 38 - A. Harris, p. 175 39 - In one week, Bomber Command killed more people than the Luftwaffe did in eight months bombing Britain. M. Hastings, p. 269 40 - A. Verrier, p. 231 41 - Webster & Frankland, p. 190 42 - M. Hastings, p. 260 43 - The Battle of Berlin began on the night of 19-20 November 1943 and lasted until March 1944 44 - A. Harris, p. 186 45 - A. Harris, p. 187; M. Hastings, p. 257 46 - Webster & Frankland, p. 264; M. Hastings, p. 257 47 - Ibid., p. 194 48 - Bomber Command counted a loss rate of 94 aircraft with Webster & Frankland a loss rate of 95 aircraft. Inconsistencies of this type are not unusual. The normal procedure adopted by the Command was to count the number of airfcraft that returned in order to minimise losses (for public morale). They did not account for those that crashed on home soil. Webster & Frankland, however, does take this into account 49 - Webster & Frankland, p. 192 50 - Ibid., p. 208 ......51 - A. Verrier, p. 293 52 - Ibid., p. 209 53 - M. Hastings, p. 267 54 - Ibid. 55 - The area destroyed amounted to 1,600 acres 56 - A. Harris, p. 242 57 - Ibid. 58 - M. Hastings, p. 341 59 - Webster & Frankland, p. 108 60 - A. Verrier, p. 276 61 - Ibid., p. 301 62 - Bob Baxter, Bomber Command Historian 63 - Ibid.