CHAPTER 1
BRITISH GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN BOMBER COMMAND DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF WAR
| There can be no absolute
definition of a 'successful raid'. Nevertheless, a
successful raid in terms of this analogy will be
identified as an attack, which yielded a fair degree of
damage to a component of the German war machine with the
least possible loss of British aircraft and aircrew. Each
raid was carried out with an estimated loss rate
predicted. This varied according to the type of target
and whether the route passed through a heavily defended
area. Any operation that achieved its objectives within
the boundaries of the predicted losses was considered a
success. However, some targets were of such importance
that they had to be destroyed at all costs, regardless of
human loss or material (3). In
order to identify the British bombing offensive's worth
in men and resources, it is necessary to start, not in
1939, but in 1942. Bomber Command was not prepared for
war in 1939 and much preparation had to be made for the
beginning of the real bomber offensive, which commenced
in 1942. Harris took over Bomber Command on 23 February 1942 and spoke in retrospect of his inability to put together a sustained offensive for one year after he assumed command (4). Nevertheless, the bombing campaign remained the only way the British could strike directly at Germany following their withdrawal from Europe on 4 June 1940. The decision was taken in 1941 to equip the entire bomber force with Gee (5). The first action of Harris was to write to the Air Ministry at the beginning of 1942 to request a target indicator and bomb-aimer whose job it would be to relieve the navigator of the task of visually identifying the target. The air-bomber was introduced in March 1942 and the target indicators in January 1943 (6). The composition of the crew changed after March 1942 to meet the standard required for the heavy bomber. The second pilot was left out of the crew and the air-bomber as put in his place. The air-bomber was trained to man the front gun and given limited pilot training. At the same time, only one crewman would be trained as wireless-operator and air-gunner; the fifth member of the crew would be a full time gunner (7). Despite instructor shortages, nineteen new squadrons were formed in the Command during 1942. With the introduction of the heavy bombers throughout the year, it was a much better equipped and balanced force at the end of 1942 (8). However, the time taken for re-equipping and retraining the crew did delay the start of the offensive (9). Arthur Harris therefore contends that there was no bomber offensive until 1942 with the first thousand-bomber raid on Cologne. He stressed that 'we should never have had a bomber offensive if it had not been for the thousand bomber attack on Cologne'. It was not until March 1943 that Harris could say, 'at least we are ready' (10). According to Harris, preparation for war demanded vast sums of money and a large supply of labour. During the war years, this flow of manpower and capital increased continually until final victory in 1945. However, the bombing campaign placed significant pressure upon the scarce resources of the nation and the finances of the treasury. The Command's preparation for war was like any other long-term capital venture. Although the initial gains were small and insignificant, they paved the way for greater returns in future years. 3 - Bob Baxter, Bomber Command Historian 4 - A. Harris, Bomber Offensive (London, 1947), p. 90 5 - Ibid., p.91 6 - Ibid., p. 97 7 - Ibid. 8 - Ibid., p. 99 9 - Ibid., pp. 101-2 10 - A. Verrier, The Bomber Offensive (London, 1968) p. 65 |